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See Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 325 (1999)
(arguing that the Caroline doctrine has been misapplied). Kearley would restrict the
Caroline to the specific circumstances in that case. Id. This Comment will argue that
even in its original form, the Caroline doctrine is not useful. Additionally, this Comment
will show that the doctrine is dead and should not be applied as custom any longer.
* Associate, Crandall, Wade & Lowe, Irvine, California. J.D. 2002, University
of San Diego School of Law.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1837 there was a Canadian rebellion against British rule. American
supporters helped the Canadian rebels by supplying ammunition and
new recruits for the rebels' army. A small steamer, called the Caroline,
was used by the rebels to bring men and supplies across the Niagara
River from the American side to the British side. The British discovered
the rebels' use of the Caroline and attacked it while it was moored to
American soil. The Caroline doctrine arose out of the diplomatic
correspondence between the United States and Britain that followed the
incident, and specifically originated from a quote by Daniel Webster
regarding the limitations on the use of self-defense.
One may wonder why an incident from 1837 should have anything to
do with the modern international law of self-defense in light of the effect
of the United Nations Charter on the way the world views the right of a
state to use force against another state. While the United Nations
Charter did change the rules on the use of force, it did not change the
inherent right of self-defense rooted in customary law.' This means that
custom is still important despite the new rules of world order created by
the United Nations. Because the right of self-defense depends on the
limits prescribed by custom, the standard of customary law on the use of
force in self-defense warrants a critical analysis of what is truly the
correct standard of customary international law.
In recent years, the Caroline doctrine has been extensively quoted as
the rule of customary law regarding the limitations of a state's right to
use force in situations of self-defense.2 However, a look into the
factual circumstances of the Caroline incident shows that the
legitimacy of the doctrine is undermined because there was no concrete
agreement made on an imminence requirement to assure the legality
of the use of force in self-defense under international law. The
diplomatic papers of Daniel Webster and Lord Ashburton have been
plucked out of their historical context and have been cited by scholars
who oppose the use of force in response to terrorist attacks. The true
Caroline doctrine has a very strict imminence requirement that cannot
be met in the modern type of armed conflict.
Even those scholars who cite to the Caroline doctrine as customary
law do not adhere to the true Caroline doctrine. Those who cite the
Caroline doctrine emphasize the lesser requirements of necessity and
proportionality but ignore its strict imminence requirement, thus

1.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
2.
E.g., ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE: BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 18, 72 (1993).
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deviating from the doctrine's original intentions. 3 This Comment will
show how the Caroline doctrine came to exist, argue that no real
doctrine was created as to an imminence requirement, and show that
what is known today as the true Caroline doctrine is really obsolete
international law and not a current standard by which to judge the
legality of a state's use of force in self-defense.
II.

BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Though there are several sources of international law, this article will
focus on custom as the basis of the inherent right of self-defense and the
Caroline doctrine's place in custom. Since the basis of common analysis
of national self-defense is that the Caroline doctrine is international law,
a brief introduction to custom, and its place in international law, is
appropriate. Custom is not a static written code. It is forever evolving
and changing. Court cases can be helpful in distilling custom; but,
unlike the usage in common law, precedent is not binding authority in
international law. What states actually do in practice matters more than
what a court says. However, some cases may give insight as to what the
court will apply as custom.
When defining custom, in addition to state practice, the opinions of
scholars and publicists are important. 4 The Statute of the International
Court of Justice defines custom as "evidenced by state practice. '5 The
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
defines customary law as the general practice of nations followed from a
sense of legal obligation. 6 The International Court of Justice, has stated
that the substance of customary law must be found primarily in the
actual practice and feeling of obligation of states .
Voluntary adherence to the law is a key feature of international law.
All states are equally sovereign and no state may deem another to have
given up rights without the other state's authorization. That is why a
3. For purposes of this Comment, I will be focusing only on the Caroline
doctrine's imminence requirement in customary international law at the time of the
Carolineincident and how that effects the current standard by which to judge the legality
of self-defense as a response to modem terrorist attacks.
4. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25-26 (Sept. 7).
5. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38.
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1986).

7.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996 I.C.J. 226, para. 64, at

253 (July 8).

state's practice and its feeling of obligation to follow a given rule are
important elements of international law. The mere writings of scholars and
publicists will not suffice to define a rule of international law; if state
practice shows that a particular rule is not actually followed because the
states do not feel an obligation to follow it, then it is not a rule.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CAROLINE INCIDENT
A detailed account of the events that led up to the Caroline incident is
important in explaining the significance of the doctrine and the assertion
that it is customary international law. The facts that follow are included
to show the gravity of the situation at the time. Many people had already
been killed in altercations before the Caroline incident and the nations
were on the brink of war. The factual background of the Caroline incident
will aid in the understanding of the context of the correspondence that
led to what became known as the Caroline doctrine.
A.

Events Leading Up to the Caroline Incident

Kenneth R. Stevens sets out a good overview of the events underlying
the Caroline doctrine in Border Diplomacy, The Caroline and McLeod
Affairs in Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1837-1842.8 For several
years before the Caroline incident, there was stirring resentment among
some Canadians over British rule.9 In 1837, there was an independence
movement led by William Lyon Mackenzie ° in Canada against British
dominance." In November of that year, unsuccessful rebellions broke
out in Lower Canada.' 2 On November 23, 1837, the rebels won a battle
at St. Denis only to lose the next day at St. Charles.' 3 At St. Charles,
fifty-six rebels were killed and thirty taken prisoner.' 4 At St. Eustace,
British troops trapped eighty rebels in a church, set it on fire, and shot
8.

KENNETH

R.

STEVENS,

BORDER DIPLOMACY: THE CAROLINE AND McLEOD

AFFAIRS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS, 1837-1842 (1989) (providing an
account of the Caroline incident that appears to be detailed and correct; however,
Stevens' conclusion regarding the legality of the British action does not seem factually
sound, as discussed below).
See also 2 JOHN BASSET MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 217 at 409 (1906).
9. STEVENS, supra note 8, at 7.
10. See id. at 8. William Lyon Mackenzie had arrived in Canada from Scotland in
1820 and established a reform newspaper. He was elected to the provincial assembly in
1928 but was expelled in 1831 for committing libel against opponents. Despite that, he
became elected many times and in 1834 became the mayor of Toronto.
11. See MAURICE G. BAXTER, ONE AND INSEPARABLE DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE
UNION 321 (1984).
12. STEVENS, supra note 8, at 9.

13.
14.

Id.
Id.

"Sinking" the Caroline

[VOL. 4: 467, 2003]

SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.

those trying to escape even though some were actually trying to,
surrender. 15 The British troops returning to Montreal, through St. Benoit,
came across Canadian citizens who surrendered without incident only to
have wild loyalist volunteers pillage and burn the towns of those who
surrendered.' 6 From all over Lower Canada, rebels made their way
across the border into the United States where the Canadian rebels found
sympathetic neighbors. 17 Along the border the rebels gathered in what
was called "Hunters' Lodges" to prepare for attacks. 18 There was brazen
talk of an invasion into Canada in these "Hunters' Lodges." 1 9
In Upper Canada, rebellions took place as well. Rebels, mostly
unarmed, marched on Toronto the morning of December 6, 1837 but
were driven back to the outskirts of Toronto, to Montgomery's Tavern,
which served as a rebel base. 20 The next day, the British closed in and
fired shots at the tavern as the rebels fled into the woods. 2 1 The
insurgents were forced to flee into western New York where they hoped
to recruit American support.

22

On December 11, 1837, Mackenzie rode into Buffalo, New York and
23
received a hero's welcome. That evening and throughout the next day,
Mackenzie and his supporters filled the Buffalo Coffee House and called
for American recruits.24 Mackenzie was successful in gaining American
support. With a force of more than 500 he occupied the British Navy
Island, a mile north of Niagara Falls, with his American recruits. 25 Here,
Mackenzie and his men set up a provisional government and prepared
for battle. The British were aware of their presence because the rebels
fired a cannon on Chippewa, a nearby shore.2 6

15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

BAXTER, supra note 11, at 321.
Id.
STEVENS, supra note 8, at 10.
Id.
BAXTER, supra note 11, at 321.

23.

STEVENS, supra note 8, at 10.

24. Id. To make the rebellion more attractive, Mackenzie promised the recruits
300 acres and 100 silver dollars each he took over the government. Id.
25. BAXTER, supra note 11, at 321.
26. Id. See also STEVENS, supra note 8, at 11 (noting that the cannon put holes in a
few houses and killed a horse).

American President Van Buren's policy regarding the conflict was one
of strict neutrality.27 The United States was not willing to get into another
war with the British. United States District Attorneys and customs
officials were instructed to enforce the nation's neutrality laws, but it
was a lost cause. 28 There was too much support for the rebellion and
anti-British feelings were too strong. The United States Marshall for
northern New York informed Van Buren that only an armed force could
stop the supply of Mackenzie's men at Navy Island.29
B.

The Caroline Incident and the Trial of Alexander McLeod

To supply the men at Navy Island, the rebels hired the Caroline, a
small steamboat, to bring support and more troops. 30 After a couple of
trips to the island, the Caroline came over to the American side of the
Niagara River on December 29 to dock for the night. 31 British
intelligence determined that the Caroline was a threat.3 2 At about
midnight, small boats carrying British-Canadian troops launched a
surprise attack on the steamer.33 A brief struggle ensued where several
Americans were injured and an American named Amos Durfee
was
34 The aggressors then set the Caroline on fire and sank it. 35
killed.
Americans were infuriated.36 The public did not see the incident as an
act of war but one of murder. Public outcry demanded that Amos Durfee's
murderer be caught and put on trial. 37 The New York authorities
arrested several Canadians in connection with the event. This, in turn,
infuriated the British because they claimed that the attack on the
Caroline was an official act, and therefore, the Americans did not have
jurisdiction to arrest individuals for the incident.38 Rumors were that
Alexander McLeod had bragged about taking part in the raid and killing
Durfee. 39 These rumors led to the prompt arrest of McLeod and his
indictment by the New York authorities for murder and arson. 40 The
27. STEVENS, supra note 8, at 12.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. BAXTER, supra note 11, at 321.
31. Id.
32. STEVENS, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that one of the scouts was Alexander
McLeod).
33. BAXTER, supra note 11, at 321.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND HIS TIME 499 (1997).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 518.
40. Id.
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arrests and indictment created severe diplomatic problems with Britain
because even if found innocent, McLeod was at serious risk of being
lynched by a mob. 4' Under these conditions it was doubtful that
McLeod would get a fair trial and Britain felt that the release of
McLeod was "indispensable to British honor., 42 Historians recall that
British and American relations were delicate and war was a very real
possibility.43 The Caroline issue remained unresolved at the end of the
Van Buren administration and the United States had no hopes of a
British apology or reparation. 44
Daniel Webster came into office as the Secretary of State with President
Harrison's cabinet at this time with an eye to settle the growing tensions.
As relations were worsening, Webster was distressed to receive reports
of Hunters' Lodges found as far west as Detroit, which meant American
rebel support was growing. 45 Though the United States was officially
neutral in the Canadian-British conflict, Webster was powerless to
enforce the neutrality laws.46 Instead, Webster turned to his diplomatic
skills to diffuse American anti-British resentments.
Webster had several correspondences with Lord Ashburton, who was
the British foreign secretary at the time. The British asserted that the
New York state courts could not try McLeod and that he should be sent
back to Canada because the British readily took full responsibility for
the attack. Although the United States federal government agreed, the
New York authorities were not willing to cooperate. It was an
embarrassment to the young federal government, which sought to gain
respect both abroad and at home. 47 The federal government was ashamed

41.

See id. at 499.

42.

STEVENS, supra note 8, at 86.

43.

See SPEAK FOR YOURSELF, DANIEL: A LIFE OF WEBSTER IN HIS OWN WORDS

305 (Walker Lewis ed., 1969). ("Webster took office at the lowest point in BritishAmerican relations since the war of 1812. So low that Lord Palmerston, the British
foreign secretary, had formally threatened war and had increased British troop strength
in Canada to seventeen regiments." Id.). See also ROBERT F. DALZELL, JR., DANIEL
WEBSTER AND THE TRIAL OF AMERICAN NATIONALISM 1843-1852 43 (1973). ("The
hoary issue[s] of impressment, international extradition, arrangements for suppressing
the African slave trade, the Caroline incident, the McLeod case, and the Creole affair
had all contributed to the steadily worsening state of Anglo-American relations in
recent years." Id.).
44. BAXTER, supra note 11, at 321.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 321-22.
47. See STEVENS, supra note 8, at x.

that it could not control the borders. 48 Yet, at the same time, there was
strong sentiment against Britain's actions. 49 McLeod was eventually
acquitted of the charges by the New York court because there were
witnesses who confirmed his alibi that he was not even near the Caroline
at the time of the incident.50 He was quickly escorted back into Canada. 5'
C. The CarolineDoctrine
Webster wrote to Lord Ashburton and stated that regardless of
whether the Caroline's actions were unlawful, the violation of national
territory was itself a wrong, and thus, the British owed an apology to the
United States.5 2 In that letter, Webster included an extract of a letter that
he had sent to Mr. Fox, dated April 24, 1841, to which Mr. Fox did not
respond.5 3 It was from a quotation in this letter to Mr. Fox, the Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Great Britain that the
Caroline doctrine originated. In this letter, Webster notes that while the
British claimed the American supporters had attacked them, the United
States government was not at all involved. 54 Thus, the British assertion
that the United States somehow "permitted" the American supporters to
break neutrality was unfair.
Webster also claimed that the British
action was unnecessary because the American supporters were actually
breaking American law and had been dealt heavy penalties under
American law. 56 Webster continued:
Under these circumstances, and under those immediately connected with the
transaction itself, it will be for her majesty's government to show upon what
state of facts and what rules of national law, the destruction of the "Caroline" is
to be defended. It will be for that government to show a necessity of selfdefense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada,
even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the
territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive;
since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that

48. See id. at 36.
49. See RICHARD N. CURRENT, DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE RISE OF NATIONAL
CONSERVATISM 119 (1955). (After describing several controversies of the day, Current
notes that an example of U.S. sentiment at the time was the resolution of a convention of
Ohioans sent to the Secretary of State asking him to "press every American grievance 'to
the last extremity' that is, to the point of war." Id.).
50. STEVENS, supra note 8, at 150.
51. Id. at 155.
52. Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (July 27, 1842), in DIPLOMATIC
AND OFFICIAL PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER WHILE SECRETARY OF STATE 104 (New York,
Harper & Brothers 1848) [hereinafter OFFICIAL PAPERS].
53. See id.
54. Id. at 104-11.
55. Id. at 105.
56. Id. at 109.
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necessity, and kept clearly within it. It must be shown that admonition or
remonstrance to the persons on board the "Caroline" was impracticable, or
would have been unavailing. It must be shown that daylight could not be
waited for; that there could be no attempt at discrimination between the
innocent and the guilty; that it would not have been enough to seize and
detain the vessel; but that there was a necessity, present and inevitable, for
attacking her in the darkness of the night, while moored to the shore, and
while unarmed men were asleep on board, killing some and wounding others,
and then drawing her into the current, above the cataract, setting her on fire,
and careless to know whether there might not be in her the innocent with the
guilty, or the living with the dead, committing her to a fate which fills the
imagination with horror. A necessity for
all this the government of the United
57
States can not believe to have existed.

Lord Ashburton then gave a reply in which he tacitly apologized for
the Caroline incident. 58 It is from this letter of apology and Webster's
letter that the Caroline doctrine was said to be formed. However, as
discussed below, there was no actual agreement under international law
and thus no real doctrine actually was formed.
IV. THE CAROLINE DOCTRINE IS NOT THE CORRECT STANDARD
TO JUDGE THE LEGALITY OF THE USE OF FORCE IN
SELF-DEFENSE

Many scholars have commented that the American and British authorities
agreed on the basic principles of the Caroline doctrine. 59 However, this
conclusion is not universally accepted.6 ° Moreover, merely because Webster
and Ashburton declared a supposed agreement on international law for
diplomatic reasons in avoidance of war does not mean that a new rule
was created. The International Court of Justice has stated that "the mere
fact that states declare their recognition of certain rules is not sufficient
for the Court to consider these as being part of customary international
law, and as such applicable to those states. 61

57.
58.

Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
Letter from Lord Ashburton to Daniel Webster (July 28, 1842), in OFFICIAL
PAPERS, supra note 52, at 111.
59. See Robert F. Teplitz, Note, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the
United States Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to
Kill George Bush?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 569, 577 (1995).
60.

See D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 675 (1970). ("The significance of the

Caroline incident and of the statement of principle by the U.S. Secretary of State, has
been widely exaggerated." Id.).
61. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 184,
at 87 (June 27).

A.

No Doctrine Was Formed

Several facts cast doubt on the assertion that the diplomatic letters
between Daniel Webster and Lord Ashburton were a declaration of
customary international law on self-defense. First, the circumstances of
the time were such that both diplomats knew that some sort of
compromise was necessary to avert a war. Both Webster and Ashburton
wanted to peacefully solve the U.S.-British disputes. 62 Additionally,
while tensions were high between the countries, these men were on
cordial and almost friendly terms.63 The letters were written when
America was young and the federal government did not enjoy the
strength and influence it has today. 64 It was an embarrassment that the
federal government could not control the States. Indeed, this added to the
British outrage towards the United States.65 In addition, there were
mounting tensions regarding the trial of Alexander McLeod. A serious
problem developed as the New York authority refused to yield to the
federal government's concerns regarding McLeod's safety.66
Second, although McLeod's acquittal saved the nations from war,
America still wanted and needed an apology. In his letter to Lord
Ashburton, Webster also included an address that. President Harrison
made to Congress stating that the United States would never cede to a
foreign government the right to enter United States' territory to
apprehend a criminal under United States' jurisdiction. 67 Lord Ashburton
62. See CURRENT, supra note 49, at 199, 120.
63. Id. at 121.
Ashburton was a partner in the firm of Baring Brothers, one of the great
English banking houses, with heavy investments in American state bonds.
Webster had been in the pay of Baring Brothers, who had looked to him for
advice on ways and means to make good the bonds which several of the states
had defaulted after the panic of '37. In the summer of 1842 Webster and
Ashburton, plenipotentiaries for their respective governments, met in
negotiations of the most informal and cozy sort, with nothing to try their
tempers except the inevitable Washington heat.
64. See STEVENS, supra note 8, at x (1989). ("The United States was still trying to
establish itself as a member of the community of nations, guided by commonly accepted
principles of international law." Id.). See also HOWARD JONES, TO THE WEBSTERASHBURTON TREATY: A STUDY IN ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1783-1843 67 (1977).
("Beneath the Americans' furor over the Caroline and McLeod affairs had run deep
indignation over apparent British reluctance to deal with the United States as an equal." Id.).
65. See STEVENS, supra note 8, at 156.
66. See I THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER cxxxvii ( Boston, Charles C. Little and
James Brown, 1851) [hereinafter WORKS].
67. Extract from the Message of the President to Congress at the commencement
of the Second Session of the 27th Congress in Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord
Ashburton (July 27, 1842), in OFFICIAL PAPERS, supra note 52, at 111-12.
This government can never concede to any foreign government the power,
except in a case of the most urgent and extreme necessity, of invading its
territory, either to arrest the persons or destroy the property of those who may
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made a reference to Webster's not-so-subtle hint that it was imperative
that the United States receive some kind of concession from the British.
Lord Ashburton wrote that he understood that no matter how the
government took the British explanation of what happened with the
Caroline, the public sentiment required a more substantial record of the
correspondence.68 In other words, he understood that Webster needed
some compromise from the British to show to the Americans in order to
quell the calls for war with Britain and prevent the proliferation of the
Hunters' Lodges.69
After acknowledging the need for compromise, Ashburton diplomatically
stated that he and Webster agreed on the principles of international law,
and that respect for sovereign territory is of the utmost importance. 70 He
did not state that he agreed with the principle unconditionally, nor did he
agree with Webster's definition of imminence. He skillfully cut away
from his concession stating:
It is useless to strengthen a principle so generally acknowledged by any appeal
to authorities on international law, and you may be assured, sir, that her
majesty's government set the highest possible value on this principle, and are
sensible of their duty to support it by their
7 1 conduct and example, for the
maintenance of peace and order in the world.

He further posited that while this important principle of territorial
sovereignty is to be respected, it is a principle of law that may be
violated upon a "strong, overpowering necessity. ' 72 Ashburton continued,
"[i]t must be so for the shortest possible period, during the continuance
have violated the municipal laws of such foreign government, or have
disregarded their obligations arising under the law of nations. The territory of
the United States must be regarded as sacredly secure against all such
invasions.
68. Letter from Lord Ashburton to Daniel Webster (July 28, 1842), in OFFICIAL
PAPERS, supra note 58, at 113.
The note you did me the honor of addressing me on the 27th instant reminds
me that, however disposed your government might be to be satisfied with the
explanations which it has been my duty to offer, the natural anxiety of the
public mind requires that these explanations should be more durably recorded
in our correspondence, and you send me a copy of your note to Mr. Fox, her
Britannic majesty's minister here, and an extract from the speech of the
President of the United States to Congress at the opening of the present
session, as a ready mode of presenting the view entertained on this subject by
the government of the United States.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.

of an admitted overruling necessity, and strictly confined within the
narrowest limits imposed by that necessity., 73 Although he later used
Webster's own words in his reply, quoting the lines, "that necessity of
self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means," 74 it was
not meant to be a firm statement of international law but a clever
diplomatic ploy. He continued the ploy by stating:
Give me leave to say, sir, with all possible admiration of your very ingenious
discussion of the general principles which are supposed to govern the right
and practice of interference by the people of one country in the wars and
applicable to our
quarrels of others,
75 that this part of your argument is little
immediate case.

As Ashburton proceeded to tell Webster that the British action was fully
justified he added:
I believe I may take it to be the opinion of candid and honorable men that
the British officers who executed this transaction, and their government
who approved it, intended no slight or disrespect to the sovereign authority
That they intended no such disrespect I can most
of the United States.
76
solemnly affirm.

Ashburton, like Webster was under pressure to have this matter resolved.
He ended his letter by stating:
I trust, sir, I may now be permitted to hope that all feelings of resentment and
ill-will resulting from these truly unfortunate events may be buried in oblivion,
and that they may be succeeded by those of harmony and friendship, which
77 it is
certainly the interest, and, I also believe, the inclination of all to promote.

In Webster's final letter, he stated that he accepted Ashburton's
agreement on the principles of law, and because he agreed, the United
States would not press the matter any further and the matter would be

considered resolved.78
Understanding the importance of this compromise for the safety of
both nations, it would have been foolhardy to press the matter further
and fight over the semantics of a principle of international law.79
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id. at 115-16.
Id. at 118.
Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), in OFFICIAL
PAPERS, supra note 52, at 119.
79. See GRIEG, supra note 60, at 676-77.
Being reluctant to exacerbate matters by alleging a breach of a duty of
prevention by the American authorities (which might have enabled the
authorities in Canada a more general power to take preventive action across the
border), the Foreign Office was content to justify the attack within the terms of
the American formulation of the law and to add an apology with a view to
facilitating a final settlement.
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Webster wrote the letter to have the last word and to have concrete proof
of the salvation of American pride. Furthermore, compromise was in the
best interest of Webster's career. He hoped to gain favor for his role in
the peacemaking. 80 Ashburton was relieved that the matter had come to
an end and did not press over technicalities and definitions in international
law. Ashburton also had what he needed: concrete proof that he did not
admit British guilt and that he fully justified the action.
It is from this friendly correspondence that modem international scholars
have attempted to extract a custom of international law. However, these
concessions by Ashburton and Webster were "merely dicta" to the real
problem of McLeod and the possible outbreak of war. 8' Reciting and agreeing
on principles of international law were not at the top of the agenda for
the two men,82 as they wanted to avoid war. In the end, the apology and
the so-called "agreement" were nothing more than an attempt to placate
the American government, with whom relations were rocky at the time.
This fact, coupled with the reality that the statement was not even
correct international law, supports the contentions that the Webster and
Ashburton letters were hardly a strong basis for the creation of a doctrine of
customary law.83 These diplomatic actions should be distinguished from
real intentions to create a custom.
B.

The CarolineDoctrine Was Not Correct Customary Law at
the Time of the Caroline Incident

The Caroline doctrine was not even a correct recitation of international
law at the time of the Caroline incident and must be viewed in the
80. See CURRENT, supra note 49, at 120. ("He welcomed the task of putting
Anglo-American relations on a new and happier basis and, at the same time, winning for
himself and the Tyler administration the blessedness that presumably would attach to the
peacemakers." Id.).
81.

See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-59 (4th ed., Cambridge

University Press 1997) (writing that one must be careful to distinguish between acts done
because of an obligation of law and acts done from a variety of other factors such as
action taken from reasons ranging from "goodwill to pique, and from ideological support
to political bribery").
82. See Kearley, supra note t, at 330. ("It is clear that Webster had no intention of
creating any general rules for the use of force by a state in self defense..." Id.).
83. See Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call
to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 25, 32 n.46

(1987). ("Also note that there has not been complete agreement among commentators
that Webster's definition is or has ever been completely accepted as the definitive
statement in this area." Id.).

context of the political events taking place.84 At the time of the Caroline
incident, customary international law allowed an absolute right to selfpreservation.85 Emerich de Vattel maintained that a country could use
all necessary means for self-preservation because a state was allowed to
use force as a legitimate means of redress.86 Therefore, even though two
states may not be at war, if a state threatens another's existence, force
may be used. Because Americans were helping the Canadian rebels attempt
to overthrow British rule, this principle could be used to show that the
British existence was threatened, making the use of force proper.
Vattel's ideas were important in American political theory.87 Although
Webster was aware of Vattel's influential theories, he could not concede
this point, for the Caroline incident was now a cause for national honor.88
Instead, Webster created a definition more suited to the American
political climate at the time.
Webster's definition was divergent from the ideas of other international
law scholars at the time. While Henry Wheaton's 1846 treatise on international

law recognized an absolute right to self-defense as an extension of the
absolute right and duty of a state for self-preservation, he never once
mentioned the Carolineincident as an example of customary international
law.89 John Westlake wrote in 1894 that Webster's quote was a correct
recitation of the law except for the element of no deliberation. 90 Robert
Phillimore, writing in 1854, stated that if the British version of the facts
were correct, the British excuse of self-defense "was a sufficient answer,
and a complete vindication." 9' Others agreed. Lord Campbell wrote:
84. See Lieutenant Colonel James P. Terry, Countering State-Sponsored
Terrorism:A Law-Policy Analysis, 36 NAVAL L. REV. 159, 172 (1986).
85. See M.D. VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE; APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, A WORK
TENDING TO DISPLAY THE TRUE INTERESTS OF POWERS 63-64 (S. & E. Butler,
Northampton, Mass., Thomas M. Pomroy, trans., 1805).
86. See STEVENS, supra note 8, at 103-04 (quoting Vattel: "If an unknown man
takes aim at me in the middle of a forest I am not yet certain that he wishes to kill me;
must I allow him time to fire in order to be sure of his intent? Is there any reasonable
casuist who would deny me the right to forestall the act?").
87. See id. at 104.
88. See id. at 104 (noting that Webster's letter of April 24 indicates agreement
with Vattel's reasoning). However, Stevens writes that "it seems unlikely that he
anticipated accepting similar arguments in relation to the Carolineraid." Id.
89. See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 101-02 (3d ed.
Philadelphia, Lea and Blanchard, eds 1846).
90.

JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 116

(Cambridge, University Press 1894). ("This was a correct statement of the law, except
so far as concerns the emergency's leaving no moment for deliberation, which is an
unnecessary condition if the emergency is such that deliberation can only confirm the
propriety of the act of self-preservation." Id.).
91. 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, M.P., COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW para.
215, at 189-90 (Philadelphia, T & J W. Johnson, Law Booksellers 1854).
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But assuming the facts that the Caroline had been engaged, and when seized by
us was still engaged, in carrying supplies and military stores from the American
side of the river to the rebels in Navy Island, part of the British territory; that
this was permitted, and could not be prevented, by the American authorities, I
was clearly of opinion that, although she lay on the American side of the river
when she was seized, we had a clear right to seize and destroy her, just as we
might have taken a battery erected by the rebels on the American92 shore, the
guns of which were fired against the Queen's troops in Navy Island.

Hannis Taylor's 1901 treatise on international law discussed the
Caroline in the context of the rule that a belligerent state may not invade
a neutral state except in cases of extreme necessity. 93 Taylor suggests
that the British invasion into American territory was necessary, but since
the Americans insisted otherwise, no agreement was formed.94 Taylor
writes that in Ashburton's responding letter, the British had no trouble
showing that the imminence of an attack made the invasion
into
95
American territory necessary, although an apology was due.
Webster's formulation did not even coincide with American state
practice at the time. In 1817,,the United States twice forcibly entered into
Spanish96territory. In one incident, pirates had taken over the Spanish Amelia
Island. President Monroe said that because Spain failed to assert their
authority over the island, the United States was justified in occupying
the island.
Later that same year, the United States entered Spanish
Florida to end problems with the Native Americans.98 Though Spain
protested, the United States maintained that the Indians were an
immediate threat and claimed they were acting in self-defense. 99 Even
though the United States claimed the tensions presented an immediate
threat, it was not the type of an overwhelming emergency with no time
for deliberation.
Other modem writers have noted that the Caroline doctrine is not a
correct statement of international law. Abraham Sofaer, legal advisor at
the U.S. Department of State, argues that Webster's statement is an
exaggeration of the requirement of necessity because that issue was
92. See AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LORD CAMPBELL, 19 (Life 2d ed. 1881) reprinted in
MOORE, supra note 8, at 414.
93.

See HANNIS TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW § 632, at

688 (Callaghan & Co. 1901).

94.
95.

See id.
Id. § 403.

96.

STEVENS,

97.

Id. at 26.

98.

Id.

99.

Id.

supra note 8, at 25.

merely peripheral to the real problem of dealing with the McLeod

issue.' 00 D.W. Grieg states that the traditional rules on the use of force
are wide enough that a plea of self-defense is less restricted than the
views expressed by Webster in regards to the Caroline incident. 1

1

He

argues that the Webster rule is limited to the situation where the
0 2 state
whose territory has been violated has committed no wrong itself.1
Ian Brownlie describes Webster's statement in the Carolinecase as an
attempt to restrict the right to go to war, though making no legal
difference to the doctrine of self-defense at the time of the Caroline
incident.'0 3 This argument was set in the context of an illegal invasion
into the United States. John Basset Moore concurs, "the attack on the
Caroline was an invasion of the territory of a neutral power-at peace
with the invader. That is a liberty not allowed by the laws of nationsnot allowed by the concern which any nation, even the' ' °4most
inconsiderable, feels for its own safety, and its own self respect[.]
C. Modern Scholars Do Not Adhere to the CarolineDoctrine's
Strict Imminence Requirement

The Caroline doctrine's limitation of the use of force in self-defense
only to situations where there is "no moment for deliberation" indicates
a very small window of time in which a state may respond to an attack.
This restrictive imminence requirement of the Caroline doctrine is
illogical in light of today's modern problems with terrorism.10 5 In the
100. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in
InternationalLaw: Terrorism, The Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89,
97 (1989).
101.
See GREIG, supra note 60, at 677.
102. See id.
103.

See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES

42-43 (1963).
Webster's Note was an attempt to describe its limits in relation to the particular
facts of the incident. The statesmen of the period used self-preservation, selfdefence, necessity, and necessity of self-defence as more or less interchangeable
terms and the diplomatic correspondence was not intended to restrict the right
of self-preservation which was in fact reaffirmed. Many works on international
law both before and after the Caroline case regarded self-defence as an
instance of self-preservation and subsequently discussed the Caroline under
that rubric.
104. See MOORE, supra note 8, at 413 (quoting BENTON, THIRTY YEARS' VIEW
II, 290).
105. See Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, InternationalLaw, and the Use of Military
Force, 18 WIS. INT'L L. J. 145, 166 (2000). ("[T]his window of opportunity, under the
traditional criteria for self-defense, will almost never exist in the context of terrorist
attacks. The traditional requirements for self-defense are simply too restrictive to
reasonably respond to the threat posed by international terrorism." Id.). See also Major
Philip A. Seymour, The Legitimacy of Peacetime Reprisal as a Tool Against StateSponsored Terrorism, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 221, 229-30 (1990).
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nineteenth century, writers were not using the Caroline doctrine as a
source of customary law on self-defense. Its use was limited to the Caroline
incident's particular facts. :Theodore Woolsey, in 1879, limited the
Caroline doctrine to the right of neutral states to not be invaded during
war. 106 T.J. Lawrence cites the Caroline doctrine for the proposition that
only in great necessity may a belligerent state invade a neutral state but
that it would be a "technical offense" that should be apologized for, not
an offense for which great reparations should be paid.1" 7
Taking the doctrine out of its context can lead to illogical results.
Today, unlike during the time of the Caroline, states may not blatantly
use force as aggressors because of the new proscriptions against that in
international law. 18 Instead, the modern aggressor is more likely to be a
group of individuals acting not under official orders of the government,
but rather without fear that the host country will stop them. When
Daniel Webster wrote the letter to Lord Ashburton, he could hardly have
envisioned a situation in which terrorists acting under the protection of a
state would conduct brutal attacks on innocent civilians leaving the
identity of the aggressors and their location in doubt.'0 9
Before a state can reasonably respond to an attack, time must be spent
identifying the terrorist group and their location and determining whether a
state has supported the terrorists and their actions.' ° However, by the
time this information is gathered, under the Caroline doctrine, an attack
to stop the terrorists from executing further attacks would not be
permissible."' Once the imminence is gone, any attack to stop future

106. See generally THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW. DESIGNED AS AN AID IN TEACHING, AND IN HISTORICAL STUDIES
(5th ed. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons 1878).
107.

See T.J. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 609-10 (6th

ed. 1911).
The incident may be held to show that temporary violations of neutral
territory, resorted to under stress of great emergency, and limited in point of
time and magnitude to the warding off of the danger which caused them, are
but technical offences, to be apologised for one the one hand and condoned
on the other, but not regarded as serious wrongs for which substantial
reparation is due.
108. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
109. See Travalio, supra note 105, at 165.
110. Id. at 165. For purposes of this Comment, I am limiting the scope to the
Caroline doctrine. It is noted that there is a substantial amount of debate regarding what
acts constitute state sponsorship.
111.
Id.

threats would be too remote in time and not true self-defense. 112 Today,3
terrorist attacks are characterized by continuing, but intermittent, acts." 1
When one attack is completed, the threat does not end." 14 With this in
mind, Gregory M. Travalio concludes that while the use of force should
be necessary and proportional, it does not have to be in response to an
imminent threat, with no chance for deliberation like the Caroline doctrine
requires." i5 Travalio instead asserts that "there must be a substantial
likelihood that the threat will become manifest before it can be eliminated
by means other than the use of military force."" 16
Due to the problems of applying the Caroline doctrine outside of its
specific facts, it appears that the current scholarly practice is to cite
to the Caroline doctrine ignoring its imminence requirements and
instead focusing on the established customary law principle that selfdefense requires necessity and proportionality."'
In fact, most
authors have interpreted the Caroline doctrine this way. For example,i8
after quoting the restrictive language of the Caroline doctrine,"
Stanimir Alexandrov opines:
It can thus be concluded that self-defense has three main requirements: (i) an
actual infringement of the rights of the defending state; (ii) a failure or inability
on the part of the other State to use its own legal powers to stop or prevent the
infringement; (iii) acts of self-defense must be strictly confined to the object of
stopping the infringement and have to be reasonably proportionate to what is
required for achieving this object. 1 19

This bears no resemblance to Webster's words of "instant," "overwhelming,"
and "no moment for deliberation." Instead, Alexandrov concentrates on
the necessity of the action, not the imminence. Alexandrov is not the
only scholar to gloss over the Caroline doctrine's restrictive limitations
on the use of self-defense. Those writers who do not explicitly express
their disapproval of the Caroline doctrine interpret it broadly so its
application does not have absurd results. 120 For example, one author
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 172.
116. Id.
117. See Leah M. Campbell, Comment, Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal
Analysis of the Decision to Strike Sudan and Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1081
(2000). This Comment is typical of the analysis. While the Caroline doctrine is
mentioned, in an analysis of customary law of self-defense, only necessity and
proportionality are discussed.
118. "[N]ecessity of self-defense instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment of deliberation...", quoted in STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELFDEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1996).
119. Id.
120.

See PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS, 163-64 (1948) (stating

that the Caroline doctrine is a correct interpretation of international law in that the use of
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argues that the Caroline doctrine allows action if either of two conditions
are met: 1) the host state could not respond in time to the danger; or, 2)
lz
even if the host state had time, they still could not stop the action. 2
These elements focus on minimizing the damage suffered by the host
state. The imminence requirement is not mentioned. Instead, the author
focuses on a host state's duty. Others have argued that the doctrine should
be interpreted in light of modem realities.' 22 In fact, one interpretation
actually creates a "new" theory of self-defense to get around the Caroline
doctrine's useless restrictions.'2' These measures appear pointless. Taking
the doctrinal analysis to its logical conclusion, it would seem that if in
order for self-defense to be justified a nation must only defend itself in
the situation where there is no time for deliberation, states would be
discouraged from consulting with allies or the Security Council before
acting. Therefore, although frequently cited, the Caroline doctrine's
imminence requirement is left out of the analysis and the concentration
of scholars is on the less strict requirements of necessity and
proportionality. Despite a long history of application, this doctrine was

force should be a last resort). However, he did not expand on this idea. Despite his
favor for the doctrine, he would probably also modify the definition not to require a total
lack of deliberation. Id. See also W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to International
Terrorism: InternationalResponses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 3, 46-47 (1999)
(quoting the restrictive language as well, Reisman concludes:
[T]he Caroline doctrine, as agreed by Webster and Ashburton, would allow a
target state to act unilaterally against a planned a terrorist attack emanating
from the territory of the other state, if it were clear that either of two conditions
obtained: (1) the state from whose territory the action was emanating could
not, even with the information supplied to it by the target, respond in a timely
fashion to prevent the terrorist act because of a shortage of time; or, (2) the
state from whose territory the action was emanating could not, even with
adequate notice, act effectively to arrest the terrorist action.
Again, the Caroline doctrine's inconvenient requirements were left out).
121. See Reisman, supra note 120, at 46-47.
122. See Alberto R. Coil, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to
Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW PROC. 287, 302 (1987) (stating that Webster's

key words "deserve a more expansive meaning today than they had in 1837.").
123. See Major Michael Lacey, Self-Defense or Self-Denial: The Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 296-308, (2000)

(arguing that under the Caroline doctrine the U.S. action against the Sudan and
Afghanistan in 1998 was inappropriate because it could not meet the standard of
"instant," "overwhelming," and "no moment for deliberation.") Lacey then criticizes the
strict interpretation stating that it is an unrealistic view to require a state to take the first
blow when they could avoid the attack. Instead, he introduces a justification ofjuris ad
vitae (right to life). Id. This concept is based on the premise that the state has a
responsibility to protect the lives of its citizens.

actually misapplied. 24 The diplomatic gesture should not be used as a
declaration of international law.' 25 Lord Ashburton only agreed to avoid
conflict in diplomatic relations. 26 These letters from which the doctrine
was crafted could not have been intended to result in a customary law.
The diplomatic gestures were not a correct recitation of international law
at the time of the Caroline incident. As a result, the doctrine created
from the incident is actually not a useful doctrine. 27 Because the Caroline
doctrine is not useful, international law scholars and practitioners
should
28
not be forced to adhere, or pretend to adhere, to a dead law.
The Caroline doctrine's restrictive imminence requirement can lead to
some illogical interpretations.
An example is Kenneth Stevens'
assertion that the Caroline was not an immediate threat to the British
because the Caroline only had 150 Patriots on board and the British had
2500 Canadians to repel the attack. 29 The argument is not persuasive
because the Caroline's crew was armed and would have been capable
and ready to use deadly force if needed, and in fact were planning to do
just that with the rebels at Navy Island. 30 It is doubtful that even an
army of 2500 would feel comfortable letting an army of 150 fire the first
shots at them, merely because they outnumbered them. Additionally,
Stevens also criticized the British because they observed the Caroline for
124. For example, the application of the Caroline doctrine has led to absurd results.
See Maureen F. Brennan, Comment, Avoiding Anarchy: Bin Laden Terrorism, The U.S.
Response, and the Role of Customary InternationalLaw, 59 LA. L. REV. 1195, 1200-03
(1999) (adhering to the strict rules of the Caroline Doctrine). Brennan argues for the
absolute strict interpretation and quotes Professor Jordan Paust for espousing the view
that the ten day period between the bombing at the Berlin nightclub and the U.S.
response in bombing Libya in 1986 was inappropriate because the immediacy was gone.
The fact that terrorism continues to be an on-going problem would suggest that this
application to terrorist situations is not appropriate. Id.
125. See GREIG, supra note 60, at 676. ("Nor should too much be read into the fact
that the British Government accepted the formulation of the law put forward by the U.S.
Secretary of State." Id.).
126. Id. at 676-77.
127. See id. at 675. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 103, at 429. ("In isolation
Webster's test is no more informative than the crude formula that there must be a
necessity to act: there is the advice that there must be a necessity to act in self-defence
but no definition of the latter concept." Id.).
128. See Commander Byard Q. Clemmons and Major Gary D. Brown, Rethinking
InternationalSelf-Defense: The United Nations' Emerging Role, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 217,
221 (1998) (stating that while the Caroline is a starting point in analyzing self-defense, it
has been "creatively sculpted... beyond recognition.") The authors state that the modern
interpretation requiring necessity and proportionality without the limiting time
restrictions of no opportunity for deliberation is a better standard. Id.
129. See STEVENS, supra note 8, at 35-36.
130. Accounts are split whether the Caroline was armed. Americans criticized
the British for attacking an "unarmed vessel," however, the Caroline was
transporting supplies and ammunition. See id. at 13. It would seem that if they
were carrying supplies and ammunition that the people on the boat could have used
the supplies if needed.
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hours before attacking. 13 1 They carefully surveyed the boat and after
deliberation concluded it was a serious threat.132 Instead of being
criticized, such deliberation should be applauded: 33 The decision to use
force against another nation should be deliberated. 34 This is not a
domestic criminal law context in which public policy is served by
outlawing the premeditated revengeful use of force. 135 This policy
leaves strict interpretation of little use.' 36 In the'context of international
law, the use of force should be thought out thoroughly and scrutinized
for other possible solutions. 137 At least the British did not hastily attack
the Carolinewithout determining whether such action was necessary. In
repelling an attack from those who plan to harm a state, the state should
not be required to conduct the operation in such a way as to- lose
advantage. The element of surprise employed by the British was not
illegal, but instead a clever strategy in asserting the right of self-defense.
When the doctrine is correctly quoted, it is usually plucked out of its
original context to be used when convenient to the agenda of the expounder.
An example is Oscar Schachter's conclusion that the standard does
include imminence. 38 He argues that it cannot be said that the Caroline
131. See STEVENS, supra note 8, at 35-36.
132. See id. at 35-36.
133. See Major Michael N. Schmitt, The Resort to Force in International Law:
Reflections on Positivist and Contextual Approaches, 37 A.F. L. REV. 105, 116-17
(1994) (arguing that the Caroline rule is inadequate). Schmitt notes that with the
prevalence of weapons of mass destruction, waiting for the absolute last second to repel
an attack is not smart military policy. Id.
134. See Lieutenant Commander Michael Franklin Lohr, Legal Analysis of United
States Military Responses to State-Sponsored International Terrorism, 34 NAVAL L.
REV. 1, 17 (1985). ("It is often stated that the language used by Secretary Webster in
referring to 'no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation' is misleading in that a
state using force in self-defense is required to deliberate prior to using such force." Id.).
Lohr also notes that the deliberations can take place over a short period of time and that
the requirements of necessity and proportionality are less rigid in response to an armed
attack rather than anticipatory self-defense. Id.
135. See Judith A. Miller, NATO's Use of Force in the Balkans, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 91, 95 (2001) (stating that Webster articulated a principle like the domestic
principle on international law, but unlike the international law principle).
136. See JESSUP, supra note 120, at 163-64 (noting that Webster's definition of
necessity is drawn from domestic law, and that it is a rare case that it would be useful in
an international law situation).
137. See Miller, supra note 135, at 95. ("The customary law of self-defense is
not that demanding, and most international legal practitioners agree that the use of
force in self-defense does not require that there be a preceding or even simultaneous
armed attack." Id.).
138. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1620, 1634-35 (1984).

doctrine was state practice at the time, but it reflects a desire to restrict
force when no armed attack occurred. 139 Schachter then uses as the
example of the U.N. Security Council's use of the Caroline doctrine in
rejecting Israel's claims that it was justified in bombing nuclear reactors
in Iraq in self-defense. 140 Here, Schachter's example only refers to
threats posed by a reactor-not an actual armed attack. The problem is
necessity. Because the plant was not used for an attack, it was blown up
prematurely. However, if it were used, it could hardly be said that Israel
would have had time to deliberate.
Those in favor of the use of the Caroline doctrine as international
customary law have stated that the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.)
approved of its requirements in Nicaragua v. United States.'4 1 The
credibility of this position is left in doubt because the I.C.J did not
explicitly mention the Caroline doctrine in its holding. 42 The only time
the Caroline doctrine is explicitly mentioned is in Judge Stephen
Schwebel's dissenting opinion in which he states: "It should be recalled
that the narrow criteria of the Caroline case concerned anticipatory selfdefense, not response to an armed attack or actions tantamount to an
armed attack."' 143 Furthermore, it has been argued that the I.C.J. is in no
position to impose standards that would require states to act in the best
interests of their citizens and restrain the better judgment of military
officials on the assumption that another armed attack will not occur
when the enemy still has the capability to support an attack. '44
D. Lack of State PracticeSuggests that the CarolineDoctrine
is Not Customary InternationalLaw
The continued reliance on the Caroline doctrine is another example of
the tendency to discover new customary law based on a statement that14a
legal rule has now been recognized without showing a general practice.
The Caroline doctrine is no longer customary law because it does not
reflect current state practice. 46 Although some countries have recently
139. See id. at 1634-35.
140. See id.
141. See Teplitz, supra note 59, at 579 n.77.
142. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra note 61, para. 184, at 87.
143. Id. at 362 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
144. See Sofaer, supra note 100, at 97. Note also that other authorities mention the
Nuremberg Military Court's approval of the doctrine in denying Nazi Germany's claim
of self-defense for invading Norway. GEORG SWARSCHZENBURGER, 2 INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 30 (1968) (stating that the
plea was not one of self-defense but one of necessity).
145. See DAMROSCH, ET. AL, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 96 n.4.
146. See Schachter, supra note 138, at 1634-35. ("It cannot be said that the
formulation reflects state practice (which was understandably murky on this point when
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quoted the Caroline doctrine in the United Nations to condemn certain
uses of force, 147 in practice, most countries that were able to ward off a
threat of impending attack used military action and justified it as selfdefense without the limits of imminence. It has also been noted that the
proscription against reprisals in the Charter era may be rapidly degenerating
because of the lack of actual state practice concerning the rule
prohibiting forcible actions against terrorist bases. 48 From the years 1969
through 1988, there averaged about one such forcible action per year. 49
The United States and Israel have both been popular targets for
terrorists in recent years and both countries use force in response to
terrorist attacks. In 1986 the U.S. conducted a raid on Libya in response
to terrorist activity. Though slightly criticized, Britain sided with the
U.S. and declared that it was valid self-defense. 15 Israel attacked
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Tunisia in
retaliation after the PLO had attacked Israel.' 5' Israel argued that
Tunisia had allowed itself to be a target and that the action was proper.
In 1998, the United States attacked terrorist bases in Afghanistan and the
Sudan after Osama Bin Laden sponsored and organized attacks on the
U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania where more than two-hundred
people were killed. 52 The United States defended the action on the
basis of necessity and proportionality. 153 The emphasis was on the
continuing threat that necessitated action, not immediacy. The United
States justified the action stating: "the targets struck, and the timing and
method of attack used, were carefully designed to minimize risks of
collateral damage to civilians and to comply with international law,
including the rules of necessity and proportionality."' 154 Most recently,
war was legal), but it is safe to say it reflects a widespread desire to restrict the right of
self-defense when no attack has actually occurred." Id.).
147. See U.N. SCOR, 17th Sess., 1024th mtg. at 51, U.N. Doc S/PV.1024 (1962).
The delegate from Ghana uses the Webster formulation to address the U.N. Security
Council regarding the incident that came to be known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. Id.
148.

See AREND & BECK, supra note 2, at 153.

149.

See id.

150.

Seeid.

151. See Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread On Us":
International Law and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 Wis. INT'L L. J. 153,
182 (1994).
152.

See Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., The Use of Armed Force Against Terrorism:

American Hegemony or Impotence?, 1 CHI.J. INT'L L. 37, 44-45 (2000).
153. See id.
154. Letter from Bill Richardson to President of the Security Council (Aug. 20,
1998) at 1, U.N. Doc S/1998/780 (1998).

the United States used force in Afghanistan and bombed the terrorist
bases of Osama Bin Laden in response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.
According to the Caroline doctrine, state practice indicates that there
is no feeling of obligation to adhere to its precepts. The lack of
obligation prevents the doctrine from being true custom.155 Instead, the
"doctrine" is actually just a peculiar little quote that has been taken out
of context for the purposes of criticizing the validity of a state's assertion
of the right of self-defense in protecting its nationals and its territory
from the violence of terrorism.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Caroline doctrine was no more than an exchange of polite
diplomatic letters in order for both Britain and the United States to keep
honor, while at the same time smoothing tensions between the two
states. The political climate was such that a compromise was necessary
to keep both nations away from the prospect of war. Both diplomats
knew this and used the letters for their own advantage at home without
thought or implication of any principle of international law.
Scholars note that Webster's recitation of what he called "international
law" was not even correct in its time. At the time of the Caroline incident,
there was an absolute right to self-preservation and the use of force was
an extension of that right. In fact, Webster's imminence requirement was
never really followed. What has become custom are the requirements of
necessity and proportionality. These principles are often cited as the Caroline
doctrine even though they only represent a portion of the doctrine.
Scholars and state actors do not follow the imminence requirement, and
thus do not adhere to the doctrine in its entirety. Although some scholars
and state actors may still try to pluck the imminence requirement out of
its historical context for political advantage, it is only that out-of-context
quote that leads to absurd results if actually applied.
Referring to the requirements of necessity and proportionality as the
Caroline doctrine is misleading because it ignores the imminence requirement.
The Caroline doctrine should not be quoted as the standard for the
limitations on self-defense but instead be remembered as a part of history.
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